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Faculty and Deans

State Regulation of Religious Education

Controversies between state education officials and religious parents began with the establishment of public schools and continue
today. Early battles concerned states' authority to outlaw private schooling altogether; contemporary skirmishes center on
whether and how state regulations governing teacher certification, the curriculum, and
470
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the like apply to religious parents and
schools.
The right of parents to send their children
to private schools was established in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters (1925). At issue in Pierce
was an Oregon law outlawing private education. Sponsored by the Ku Klux Klan and
rooted in religious hatred, the Oregon law
was designed to impose Protestant values on
Catholic schoolchildren. In Pierce the Court
ruled that the state could not outlaw private
schooling and that the Oregon statute would
cause a state-imposed standardization that is
contrary to the fundamental theory of liberty
on which American government is based. For
the Court, "[t]he child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."
Pierce, although critically important to
religious educators, was rooted in Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process protections and not
First Amendment religious liberty rights.
That the First Amendment provides additional protections for religious parents was
explicitly recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder
(1972), in which the Supreme Court held that
the state's interest in compulsory education
was not of sufficient magnitude to override a
parent's interest in having her child exempted
from public school for religious reasons.
Although the Court in Yoder recognized the
legitimacy of a state's interest in mandating
compulsory education, it upheld the claims of
members of the Old Order Amish Faith, who
sought to exempt their children from high
school attendance. First, the Court emphasized the diluted state interest in educating
14- and 1S-year-old children who were socially acculturated and possessed basic reading, writing, and computation skills. Second,
the Court accepted the proposition that the
early teenage years were crucial in determining whether a child would remain part of the
Old Order Amish Faith, which therefore elevated the parents' interest in removing their
children from public schoo!.
The exemption granted the Amish in
Yoder should not be construed as an unlimited license for parents to control the education of their children. At the outset, the Court
noted: "There is no doubt as to the power of a
State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regu-

lations for the control and duration of basic
education. Providing public schools ranks at
the very apex of the function of a state." The
Court, therefore, would not have permitted
the removal of Amish children if they were
too young to have acquired basic academic
skills. In addition, the Court stressed the selfcontained nature of the Amish community.
Apparently, the Court would not have exempted the children in Yoder from public
school attendance if they seemed likely to become members of mainstream society. Finally,
the Court suggested that it would not accord a
similar right to parents who wished to remove
their child from school for nonreligious reasons. The Court emphasized that "[the compulsory attendance law] carries with it
precisely the kind of objective danger to the
free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent."
The reaches and limits of Pierce and
Yoder have been tested through a series of
challenges by Christian educators to state
laws governing private schools and home instruction. With the Supreme Court declining
to resolve this dispute, the battle between education officials and religious parents takes
place before state courts and legislators.
This legal battle between state regulators
and religious parents and educators apparently pits intractable foes in a fight to the
death. Religious interests, it seems, reject any
state involvement in their educational ministries. State actors seem likewise unyielding
in their demand that religious educators
mimic their public school counterparts.
The source of the confrontation is widespread dissatisfaction both among fundamentalist Christian parents and within the state
educational establishment. The main reason
that fundamentalist Christian parents opt out
of public schools is their perception that the
schools' "secularization" (attributed to
Supreme Court decisions prohibiting organized
prayer, Bible reading, the teaching of biblical
creationism, and the display of the Ten
Commandments in classrooms) denies their
right to oversee the upbringing of their children
as they see fit. Many fundamentalist Christian
educators also complain of the perceived
"breakdown" in public education, which they
associate with lack of discipline, sexual permissiveness, and drug and alcohol abuse.
In court, fundamentalist Christians attack state regulations as being antireligious
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and poor educational policy. They depict the
state education bureaucracy as either insensitive or hostile to the religious mission of fundamentalist Christian educators. Unlike
Catholic, Jewish, and other religious educators-who often embrace teacher certification
requirements and other state regulationsfundamentalist Christian educators and home
study proponents have greater difficulty complying with state regulations that seek to
make private schools like public schools. With
respect to teacher certification requirements,
for example, fundamentalist educators sometimes claim that the inculcation of secular
norms through state certification procedures
are inconsistent with their religious beliefs.
Furthermore, contending that many such regulations serve no useful educational purpose,
fundamentalist Christians deem state regulatory initiatives as de facto religious harassment. To support their contention of
regulatory ineffectiveness, fundamentalist
Christian educators and parents point to the
fact that their students generally perform as
well as or better than their public school
counterparts
on
nationally recognized
achievement tests.
Weighing against these arguments is the
state's paramount, compelling interest in the
education of its youth, which was recognized
by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka (1954): "[EJducation is
perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments." Not surprisingly,
state education officials are reluctant to subordina te their rule-making authority and instincts to validate the deregulatory agenda of
fundamentalist Christian educators and
parents. The dispute between state educators
and religious parents is further complicated by
the extraordinary variety of regulatory regimes
available to state lawmakers and regulators.
State legislators have enacted, to varying
degrees, regulations that require private sectarian schools to satisfy minimal standards in
the following areas: fire, health, and safety;
the curriculum; textbook selection; instructional time; teacher certification; zoning; consumer protection; student reporting; testing;
state licensing; community interaction; and
guidance services. The most controversial of
these regulations are programmatic ones that
govern actual teaching practices in nonpublic
schools, including the curriculum, textbook
selection, and teacher certification. States con472

tend that such regulations are necessary to ensure that all students attain certain minimal
educational standards that are necessary for
the welfare of the child and society.
Regulation of home education likewise is
extremely varied among the states. At one extreme, some states allow parents to teach their
children at home with minimal supervision.
Parents need only provide the state board of
education with a proposed home study program and administer a standardized achievement test at the end of each school year. At
the other extreme, some states impose curriculum and teacher approval requirements.
Furthermore, it is often difficult to ascertain
what parents must do to have a home study
program approved by the state or local education authority. The primary reason for this confusion is that twenty-one states allow home
instruction by permitting "equivalent" or
"comparable" instruction outside of schools.
As might be expected, the determination of
equivalency varies considerably from state to
state and from district to district within a state.
The Supreme Court, which has not yet
decided a dispute concerning state regulation
of home instruction or Christian schooling,
has provided limited guidance about states'
authority in this area. Currently, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognizes the constitutionality of reasonable state regulations of private
schools that promote a compelling state interest in education. In Board of Education v.
Allen (1968), for example, the Court observed
that "[sJince Pierce, a substantial body of case
law has confirmed the power of the States to
insist that attendance at private schools, if it is
to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws,
be at institutions which provide minimum
hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training and cover prescribed subjects of
instruction." In other words, because the state
cannot abolish parochial schools, it must satisfy its secular interests in education via private schools. Therefore, the state must have
the authority to regulate the secular educational function of private and home schools.
Numerous other Supreme Court decisions
have recognized the rights of a state to impose
reasonable regulations on private schools. But
the Supreme Court has yet to determine where
it should draw the line between reasonable
and unreasonable state regulations.
Needless to say, state officials and religIOus educators subscribe to quite different
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theories of what regulations are "reasonable,"
and judicial attempts to resolve this dispute
have been truly unsatisfactory. Such cases
often present courts with an apparently hopeless entanglement of fact, judgment, secular
values, and religious conviction; as a result,
court decisions are often at odds with one another. Some courts approve and others invalidate identical regulatory schemes. There are
also great variances within a state. State and
local education officials are inconsistent in applying the often vague regulatory demands,
and they are selective in enforcing the law.
The variability of judicial decisionmaking
is apparent in competing judicial perceptions
of teacher certification requirements. Courts
that rule for the state see themselves as "illequipped to act as school boards and determine the need for discrete aspects of a
compulsory school education program"; they
argue "that it goes without saying that the
State has a compelling interest in the quality
and ability of those who [teach] its young people" (State v. Shauer [N.D., 1980], State v.
Faith Baptist Church [Neb., 1981]). Courts
that side with religious interests appear
equally presumptive. They find it "difficult to
imagine ... a state interest sufficiently substantial to sanction abrogation of [the parent's] liberty to direct the education of their
children," and, although seeing a bachelor's
degree as an "indicator" of competency, they
nonetheless find a bachelor's requirement excessive because "it is not a sine qua non the
absence of which establishes [incompetency]"
(State v. Whisner [Ohio, 1976], Kentucky
State Board v. Rudasill [Ky., 1980]).
Vagaries in judicial approaches are a result of many factors. Poor lawyering by some
state prosecutors and by some attorneys for
fundamentalist Christian educators offers a
partial explanation for this judicial failure.
Varying regulatory schemes are also at issue.
More significantly, Supreme Court decisions
provide ample support for each side.
Disputes between the state and funda mentalist Christian educators are ill suited to
judicial resolution. These days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if denied the opportunity for an
education . Because of the centrality of the
state's interest in ensuring the provision of
good education to all youngsters, the state is
vested with the authority to esta blish reasonable regulations governing both public and

private schools. The state, however, bears a
great cost when it engages in open confrontation with fundamentalist Christian educators.
The chief problem is one of enforcea ble sanctions. Under its parens patriae power, the state
can, on occasion, assume custody of a child if
that is in the child's best interest. For example,
the state may exercise this power in the face of
parental neglect. While the state most frequently exercises its parens patriae power to
prevent physical abuse and neglect of children, the state also has authority under this
power to enforce truancy statutes.
Fundamentalist Christian educators have
been willing to push the state to this extreme.
Yet, for many reasons, states do not want to
reach this degree of confrontation. The closing of churches, the jailing of individuals for
practicing their religion, and the displacement
of children demand a compelling justification.
With fundamentalist Christian school and
home study students outperforming their public school counterparts, and with increasing
public awareness of problems with public
school education, the state cannot offer a
compelling justification for its enforcement
actions. Moreover, with public attention focused on public schools, it is politically counterproductive for the state to expend scarce
educational resources on the enforcement of
controversial private school and home study
regulations.
Deregulation of religious education-or
nonenforcement of regulations-seems a sensible political solution. Confrontations between the state and fundamentalist Christian
educators are politically divisive, and, if carried to their logical extreme, ultimately may
force the state to jail parents and ministers
and seek custody of children. Additionally, if
the state feels compelled to reverse its previous policies, it may appear weak, and its interest in education will be subject to challenge . In
many instances, the most expedient political
course is to strike a balance favoring religious
liberty and parental rights.
Massive legislative reform of both home
instruction and church-affiliated schools bears
this out. Some states, however, have elected to
avoid conflicts with dissenting religious parents and educators by scra pping all meaningful regulations. In these states, students need
not demonstrate proficiency in core subject
areas. Instead, they need only take a standardized achievement test. But to mandate test
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taking without mandating a minimal passing
score is to substitute the state's critical interest
in the education of its youth with a symbolic
fig leaf.
The challenge for lawmakers and regulators, as recognized by the National
Association of State Boards of Education, is
" to meet their obligations to assure all children receive a quality education while considering the relative rights of parents to educate
their children. " This challenge cannot be ignored. At the most practical level, many students participating in home study programs
and attending fund amentalist Christian
schools will later be "absorbed" into public
school systems. More significant, the state's
interest in the well-being of its children as well
as its own well-being demands that these children no t be discounted.
Neal Devins
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